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ANTITRUST AND Two-SIDED PLATFORMS: THE
FAILURE OF AMERICAN EXPRESS
John B. Kirkwoodt

Two-sidedplatforms serve two sets of customers and enable them to interactwith
each other. The five most valuable corporations in America-Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft- operate two-sided platforms. But despite their
growing power, the Supreme Court's American Express decision has made it harder
to stop them from stifling competition. This Article systematically exposes the flaws in
the Court's reasoningand identifies the principles that shouldgovern future cases.
The Court's most fundamental errorwas to requireplaintiffs in rule of reason
cases to make an initial showing of consumer harm that weighs the effects of the
defendant's conduct on both sides of its platform. This unprecedented approach will
discourage antitrustlitigation.It is also flawed antitrustpolicy because it allows afirm
to exploit customers on one side of its platform to benefit customers on the other side.
I argue that such conduct by a platform should only be permissible in the face of a
market failure-an obstacle that prevents the market from maximizing consumer
welfare. Without a market failure-and American Express (Amex) could not
demonstrate one-competition will produce the optimal allocationof benefits acrossa
platform.

t Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law; American Law Institute; Executive
Committee, AALS Antitrust and Economic Regulation Section; Advisory Board, American
Antitrust Institute; Advisory Board, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies. This Article was
presented at the annual meeting of the AALS Antitrust Section and the Antitrust Scholars Forum
at University of California, Irvine School of Law. I want to thank the participants for their
comments, especially Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Christine Pedigo Bartholomew, Aaron Edlin,
Harry First, Christopher Leslie, John Newman, Steve Salop, Sean Sullivan, and Tod Zywicki. In
addition, Rebecca Allensworth, Christine Pedigo Bartholomew, Brooke Coleman, Charlotte
Garden, Warren Grimes, Keith Leffler, John Newman, and Heather Kirkwood read or discussed an
earlier draft and provided excellent suggestions.

1805

1806

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1805

The Article shows why the Court was wrong to treat Amex's two sets of
customers- cardholdersand merchants-as a single market. Instead, it offers a better
approach to discerning marketpower in antitrustcases, based on the likely effects of
the defendant's conduct. Under this approach-and contrary to the Court's
conclusion-Amex possessed market power, as its steering ban almost certainly
enabled it to maintain its merchant fees above the competitive level. The Article
concludes that American Express was deeply flawed, and that courts should confine it
to itsfacts andfollow the principlessetforth in this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Two-sided platforms are intermediaries that bring two sets of
customers together, providing valuable services to each and enabling
them to interact with each other.1 Newspapers sell information to readers
and space to advertisers and thereby allow advertisers to communicate
with readers. Likewise, credit card networks furnish services to both
merchants and cardholders, enabling the two sets of customers to transact
efficiently with each other.
Two-sided platforms are not new. But today, computers, smart
phones, and the Internet have made two-sided platforms much more
common and much more important in the economy. Microsoft's
operating system is a two-sided platform because it allows computer users
to interact with independent applications like Google's search engine.2
Similarly, the iPhone permits users not only to make phone calls but to
invoke Apple's applications and independent services like Uber and
Facebook. Indeed, thanks to the Internet, two-sided platforms like Uber,
Facebook, Netflix, Airbnb, and Amazon have proliferated. The five most
valuable corporations in America-Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook,
and Microsoft3-all operate two-sided platforms.

See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018) (stating that a two-sided
platform "offers different products or services to two different groups who both depend on the
platform to intermediate between them"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason:
The American Express Case, 2019 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 35, 37 (2019) ("[A] two-sided platform is a
business that depends on relationships between two different, noncompeting groups of transaction
partners.").
2 In fact, Windows is a three-sided platform because it interfaces with the computer that it
operates and thus allows interactions among the hardware manufacturer, applications developers,
and computer users. To simplify the discussion, I'll use the more common term-two-sided
platform-to cover multi-sided platforms as well.
3 See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Stumbles? What Stumbles?Big Tech Is As StrongAs Ever, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/technology/big-tech-earningsstumbles.html [https://perma.cc/LF66-MPYN].
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Since 2000 the literature on two-sided platforms has exploded, with
foundational articles by Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole and Jean-Charles
Rochet,4 numerous essays by David Evans and Richard Schmalensee,5
and many other contributions by legal and economic scholars.6 This
literature focuses on the distinctiveness of two-sided platforms-the ways
in which these platforms differ from ordinary products or services. Most
fundamentally, a two-sided platform must bring two sets of customers
together in order to perform its function.7 Because these sets normally do
not have the same price sensitivity, the platform typically charges one set
a relatively high price and the other set a relatively low price.8 This type
of price discrimination not only helps the platform maximize profits, it
also serves another purpose: the low price brings more customers to the
platform. This is valuable because two-sided platforms commonly create
"indirect network effects"-the utility of the platform to customers on
one side depends on the number of customers on the other side. 9 As a

4 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS'N 990, 991 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress
Report, 37 RAND J.ECON. 645 (2006) [hereinafter Rochet &Tirole (2006)].

5 See, e.g., David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 667, 668 (2005); David S. Evans & Richard
Schmalensee, Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
667 (2008); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform
Businesses, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 404 (Roger
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
6 See, e.g., Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and
Practice, 10 J. COMP. L & ECON. 293 (2014); Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided
Markets: The AntitrustEconomics of Payment CardInterchangeFees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571 (2006);
Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Economics of TwoSided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 515 (2005).

7 As Rochet and Tirole put it, platforms must design their price structure so as to "bring both
sides on board." Rochet & Tirole (2006), supra note 4, at 665.
8 See Evans & Noel, supra note 5, at 681 (stating that "[t]he optimal prices" for a two-sided
platform depend in part on the "price elasticities of demand on both sides"); Klein et al., supra note
6, at 573-74 (noting that credit card systems generally charge merchants more than cardholders
"because demand sensitivity generally is much greater on the cardholder side of the market than on
the merchant side of the market").

9 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 5, at 405; see also Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct.
2274, 2281 (2018) ("A credit card, for example, is more valuable to cardholders when more
merchants accept it, and is more valuable to merchants when more cardholders use it."). For some
scholars, indirect network effects are a defining characteristic of two-sided platforms. See, e.g.,
Muris, supra note 6, at 517 ("Three conditions must be present in a two-sided market: (1) two
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result, a platform typically has an incentive to charge a very low or even
negative price to customers on one side in order to lure more higher
paying customers to the other side.10
These basic features of platform economics imply that a two-sided
platform must address the needs of both sets of its customers. It cannot
focus on one side only. Indeed, if the platform is a two-sided transaction
platform, which enables customers on one side to transact with customers
on the other side, it cannot function at all unless at least one customer on
each side participates.1 This means that when a two-sided platform
competes with similar platforms, it must consider its offerings on both
sides of its platform. If it increases price to one set of its customers, it may
have to reduce price or provide benefits to the other set. For example,
imagine that Uber lowers the amount that drivers earn on each trip they
complete. That change might send drivers to work for Lyft, which could
drive up wait times for Uber riders. As a consequence, riders might decide
to use another ride hail service-unless Uber lowers ride prices to keep
those customers happy.
In Ohio v. American Express Co.,12 the Supreme Court relied on this
dynamic to conclude that antitrust courts cannot analyze a platform's
conduct without weighing its effects on both sides of the platform.
Addressing a two-sided platform for the first time in sixty years, 13 the
Court held that a plaintiff cannot prevail unless it proves, as part of its

distinct groups of customers; (2) the value obtained by one group increases with the size of the
other; and (3) an intermediary connects the two."); Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided
Platforms andAntitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2150 (2018); Erik Hovenkamp, Platform
Antitrust,44 J. CORP. L. 713 (2019).
io See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 5, at 405 (asserting that Rochet and Tirole had the
"fundamental insight" that the optimal strategy for a two-sided platform may "entail pricing below
the marginal cost of provision to one side and above the marginal cost of provision to the other
side"). A platform charges a negative price when it provides benefits to one set of customers (e.g.,
cardholder rewards) that exceed any fees they pay.

11See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280 ("The key feature of transaction platforms is that they
cannot make a sale to one side of the platform without simultaneously making a sale to the other.").
A credit card network is a two-sided transaction platform.
12

Id. at 2274.

The Court last considered the distinctive features of a two-sided platform in Times-Picayune
PublishingCo. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
13
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initial burden, that anticompetitive effects on one side of the platform
outweighed procompetitive effects on the other. 14
American Express arose because the federal government and
multiple states challenged the anti-steering provisions that Amex inserts
in its contracts with merchants. These provisions prohibit merchants
from inducing customers to use a credit card with a lower merchant fee. 15
On their face, they restrict price competition on the merchant side of a
credit card platform. A rival credit card network like Discover cannot
gain business by cutting its merchant fee since consumers are unlikely to
know about merchant fees and merchants cannot steer their customers
toward Discover. Merchants cannot post signs that say "We Prefer
Discover" or offer discounts for using a Discover card. 16 In short, the antisteering provisions removed the financial incentive to reduce merchant
fees.17 Focusing on this harm, the district court defined the relevant
market as credit card services provided to merchants. 18 It also held that
the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing anticompetitive effects by
proving that the anti-steering provisions had raised merchant fees. 19
The Supreme Court rejected this approach. In a 5-4 decision, it held
that the relevant market must include both sides of a credit card platform,

14

See Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. at 2281-82, 2286-88.

15 See

United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ("[P]ursuant
to Amex's [NDPs], merchants who accept American Express are not permitted to encourage
customers to pay for their transaction with credit cards that cost the merchants less to accept."),
rev'd, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), affdsub nom. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274. American Express
refers to its steering restrictions as Non-Discrimination Provisions (NDPs). See id. at 149.
16

See id. at 165.

Likewise, the anti-steering provisions removed the incentive of consumers to choose a
cheaper credit card, since a merchant could not reward consumers for making this choice. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 45.
17

18 Specifically, the district court defined the relevant market as "the market for general purpose
credit and charge card network services." Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 170. These services
"include the core enabling functions provided by networks [to] merchants." Id. at 171. The court
declined to include services provided to cardholders, noting, among other things, that "the court is
aware of no authority... that requires the court to define the relevant product market to encompass
the entire multi-sided platform." Id. at 174. I will refer to both credit and charge cards as credit
cards.
19 See id. at 208 ("Proof of anticompetitive harm to merchants.., is sufficient to discharge
Plaintiff s' burden in this case."); id. at 224 ("[T]he NDPs... result in higher prices for merchants
and their customers.").
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the cardholder side as well as the merchant side.20 It also ruled that the
plaintiffs had not shown that Amex's fee increases constituted actual
anticompetitive effects because the plaintiffs had focused on the impact
of these increases on merchants,21 ignoring or downplaying the benefits
Amex furnishes cardholders, such as a generous rewards program and
"welcome acceptance" at merchants,22 which may account for the higher
fees. Indeed, the Court stated: "Amex's increased merchant fees reflect
increases in the value of its services and the cost of its transactions, not an
ability to charge above a competitive price."23 In the Court's view, benefits
to cardholders may explain-and justify-Amex's behavior on the
merchant side.
This decision would make sense if all Amex had done was increase
its merchant fees in order to expand its rewards program. As the new
literature makes clear, a platform may change its terms on one side in
order to enhance the value it realizes on the other side, and the result may
be desirable for the platform and for its customers as a whole, increasing
output and strengthening competition.24 But this procompetitive theory
did not explain American Express. Amex did not just charge high
merchant fees and increase them repeatedly in order to expand its
rewards programs and create a more loyal and valuable set of cardholders.
It also used exclusionary conduct to prevent other credit card networks
from undercutting its fees.
Such conduct requires a different analytical framework. When a
two-sided platform takes steps to reduce rivalry, it is not appropriate to
define a two-sided market or force the plaintiff to show that the adverse
effects of this conduct on one side of the platform exceed the benefits on

2u Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 ("[C]ourts must include both sides of the platformmerchants and cardholders -when defining the credit-card market.").
21 Id. at 2287 ("Focusing on merchant fees alone misses the mark because the product that
credit-card companies sell is transactions, not services to merchants, and the competitive effects of
a restraint on transactions cannot be judged by looking at merchants alone.").
22 Id. at 2288 ("Amex uses its higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more robust
rewards program," which not only benefits cardholders but causes them to spend more, which is
"valuable to merchants"); id. at 2289 (steering would undermine the "welcome acceptance" of
Amex cards, which would harm both cardholders and merchants).
23

Id. at 2288.

See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 6, at 575 (stating that when a payment system balances its
prices on both sides, the effect is to "maximize payment system output").
24
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the other side. Unless the platform can establish a market failure-a
market imperfection that prevents competition from maximizing
consumer welfare-its conduct would not be justified and the benefits it
provides on the other side would not be cognizable efficiencies.25 A cartel
cannot legally or economically justify its higher prices by showing that it
devoted the extra revenues to greater non-price competition.26 Likewise,
a two-sided platform cannot excuse rivalry-reducing conduct on one side
of its platform by funneling the supracompetitive profits into a rewards
program for customers on the other side.27 By definition, this conduct
creates market power and transfers wealth from consumers on one side
of the platform to the platform itself. Unless the platform can show that
it was correcting a market failure, it cannot justify this exploitation by
using some or all of the wealth to fund benefits for customers on the other
side. Those benefits are a byproduct of the anticompetitive behavior, not
a reason to allow it. Consumers as a whole would have preferred the
competitive outcome. 28
The traditional rule of reason is the proper way to address these
issues. It will unearth whether the platform employed anticompetitive
conduct and whether a market failure might justify such conduct. Under
the traditional rule of reason, as the Court explained in American
Express,29 the plaintiff must first show that the challenged conduct had a
substantial anticompetitive effect. This will reveal whether the platform
used conduct that restricted rivalry on one side of the platform.30 If the
plaintiff carries that burden, the defendant may show a justification,

25 See infra Section III.A (showing that an antitrust justification requires a market failure);
accord John M. Newman, ProcompetitiveJustificationsin Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501,517 (2019).
26

See infra Section LB.

See infra Section IB; see also Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2161-62 (rejecting the "view that
anticompetitive conduct harming users on one side of a platform can be justified so long as that
harm funds benefits for users on another side of the platform").
27

28 Evans and Schmalensee state that "an accurate analysis of the impact of any platform decision
on consumer welfare must take into account all interdependent customer groups the platform
serves." Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 5, at 413. But the legality of a platform decision does not
require such a comprehensive accounting. If there is no market failure, a platform cannot excuse a
restraint on one side by showing that the restraint allowed it to increase benefits on the other side.
29 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (describing the first three steps of
the rule of reason).
30 The platform must also have market power, but as explained below, that can be inferred from
the anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct.
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which will disclose whether there is a market failure and whether, by
correcting it, the defendant produced benefits for customers on the other
side of the platform. Only if the defendant establishes a market failure,
and the plaintiff cannot show there is a better way of correcting it, would
the plaintiff have to prove that the adverse effects on one side of the
platform outweighed the benefits on the other side.
The traditional rule of reason is not only correct analytically; it has
major administrative advantages. Under the American Express Court's
version of the rule of reason, the plaintiff must show, in the very first step,
that the challenged conduct produces net harm across the entire
platform. This requires the plaintiff to anticipate all the defendant's
justifications and show that they do not offset the conduct's
anticompetitive effects, before the defendant has established a market
failure, the sine qua non of a legitimate justification.31 Such a burden is
both inefficient and counterproductive. It is inefficient because the
defendant possesses the relevant information, not the plaintiff. It is
counterproductive because it raises the plaintiffs costs, which will cause
fewer cases to be brought, even if warranted. Finally, because it forces the
judge or jury to deal in a single stage with a mass of conflicting evidence,
it will increase the likelihood of error. 32
In short, two-sided platforms do not require a "new antitrust."33
They can be analyzed appropriately with the traditional rule of reason,
provided it is applied with sensitivity to cross-platform effects and to the
key issues: anticompetitive conduct, market failure, and market power.
The Court also made several other significant errors.
First, the Court overlooked the simplest and most powerful way of
establishing Amex's market power. As I showed in a recent article,34 the
best way to demonstrate market power in the vast majority of cases is
through the likely effects of the challenged conduct. If the defendant's
conduct is likely to enable it to raise price above the prevailing level or

31

See infra Section M.A.

See Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 4, 6 (describing the administrative advantages of the
traditional rule of reason).
32

33 Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2160; accord Dennis W. Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical
Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules, 61 J.L. & ECON. 215, 232
(2018).
34

See John B. Kirkwood, Market Power andAntitrustEnforcement, 81 B.U. L. REv. 1169 (2018).
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maintain price above the but-for level-the level to which price would
otherwise have fallen-the defendant possesses market power. This
method leaves no doubt that Amex exercised market power. The evidence
demonstrated that Amex's anti-steering provisions almost certainly
prevented its merchant fees from falling to the level that unrestricted
competition would have produced.35
Second, the Court incorrectly defined the relevant market. It insisted
on a two-sided market, even though such a broad market would often
give an inaccurate picture of the defendant's market power. In this case,
since Amex is a transaction platform, the error did not affect Amex's
market share.36 But in many platform cases, the state of competition and
the identities of the competitors will differ on the two sides of the
platform.37 In those cases, the defendant's market share is likely to be
larger on the side where it has allegedly restricted competition. A onesided market would disclose that larger share; a two-sided market would
obscure it.38
Third, the Court refused to accept actual anticompetitive effects as
proof of market power because this was a vertical case, not a horizontal
case. But the type of case is irrelevant if the plaintiff shows actual
anticompetitive effects. Actual anticompetitive effects cannot occur
unless the defendant has market power.
Fourth, the Court's attempt to identify a market failure that would
justify Amex's facially anticompetitive conduct foundered. The Court
declared that merchant steering would create a negative externality
because it would reduce future use of Amex's card. This externality,
however, is not a market failure; it is a consequence of price competition.

35 See infra Section 11.A. To be sure, prices above the but-for level may not establish market
power if the challenged conduct was necessary to correct a market failure. In that case, the higher
prices may reflect the value created by eliminating the market failure and improving efficiency. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 51 (noting that a defendant may maintain higher prices by excluding
a rival, but those higher prices do not establish market power when the exclusion occurred because
of superior efficiency). As Part IV shows, however, Amex could not demonstrate that its antisteering rules corrected a market failure. See infra Part IV.
36 See infra Section II.C.2 (noting that a credit card transaction always involves both a merchant
and a cardholder and thus Amex's share of transaction volume is the same on both sides of the
platform).

37

See Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2145.

38 As explained below, a two-sided market is not needed to take into account indirect network
effects. They can be considered as part of the process of defining the scope of a one-sided market.
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Amex would be losing sales only because other credit cards offered lower
merchant fees.
In sum, American Expresswas deeply flawed. Its numerous mistakes,
if followed strictly in future cases, will make it harder to challenge
anticompetitive behavior by two-sided platforms and other firms. The
Court should have adhered to the following principles:
(1) Market power should be determined, whenever possible, by the
likely anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct. If the
plaintiff shows that the defendant's conduct is likely to increase
price above the prevailing level, or maintain price above the
but-for level, the defendant has market power.
(2) When the conduct has had actual anticompetitive effects,
market power should be inferred from those effects, whether
the challenged conduct is a vertical or a horizontal restraint.39
(3) When market power can be determined from the likely or actual
anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct, the relevant
market may be inferred from that determination. Traditional
market definition is unnecessary.
(4) When traditional market definition is needed, the candidate
market should be the side of the platform where the conduct
allegedly injured competition. The market should be expanded
to the other side only when reactions on that side would prevent
the exercise of market power on the first side.
(5) A defendant cannot justify benefits provided to customers on
one side of its platform if the benefits were funded by using
anticompetitive conduct to force customers on the other side to
pay higher prices. Benefits generated through rivalry restricting
behavior are not a cognizable efficiency, even if they are passed
through to customers on the other side of the platform, absent
a market failure.
(6) When the defendant establishes that its conduct corrected a
market failure and that the benefits provided to customers on
the other side resulted from that correction, those benefits may
be considered. But market failures are imperfections that
prevent competition from promoting consumer welfare, not

39

For the evidence required to show actual anticompetitive effects, see infra Section I.B.3.
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conditions that simply reduce the defendant's profits or
frustrate its business model.
This set of principles should guide lower courts in their analysis of
two-sided platform cases. When the platform is not a transaction
platform,40 courts should apply these principles rather than the flawed
rulings in American Express. American Express should be limited to
transaction platforms. As the Court itself recognized, transaction
platforms are "different" from other platforms.41 For one thing, the
relationship between the customers on one side and the customers on the
other side-a key issue for the Court-is closer with a transaction
platform.42 For another, a two-sided market definition is easier and more
accurate with a transaction platform.43 These differences and sound
antitrust policy dictate that American Express should be confined to its
facts. 44 That would also avoid the definitional difficulties that would arise
if the case applied to all two-sided platforms.45

40

See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018) (defining a transaction platform).

41

See id. at 2286.

See id. ("[T]ransaction platforms exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects and
interconnected pricing and demand.").
42

43

See infra Section II.C.4.

See Hovenkamp, supra 1, at 88 ("On [the market definition] question, maintaining a
coherent economic approach to antitrust policy requires that Amex be limited to its facts."); Tim
Wu, The American Express Opinion, the Rule of Reason, and Tech Platforms, 7 J. ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 117, 124 (2019) (concluding that "the American Express holding is limited to
'transaction platforms"' (citation omitted)).
44

45 See Katz & Sallet, supra 9, at 2151 (noting that there is no consensus definition of a two-sided
platform and its boundaries are "easily manipulable"). To illustrate the problem, consider whether
Safeway is a two-sided platform. Unlike Amex, which does not purchase services from merchants
and resell them to cardholders, Safeway does buy products from suppliers and resell them to
consumers. It takes title to the merchandise it resells. This difference may be enough to distinguish
American Express. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 84 ("The Amex majority's approach does not
apply when the merchandise is actually sold or licensed to the operator of the platform."). But
Safeway also sells distribution services to its suppliers, such as maintaining an adequate inventory
of their products, placing them in prominent locations, and administering their in-store
promotional campaigns. As a result, Safeway's suppliers are also its customers, which means that
Safeway has two sets of customers that it brings together: suppliers and consumers. This is enough
to satisfy the Court's definition of a two-sided platform. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280. But
Safeway is not a two-sided transaction platform. It does not facilitate direct, simultaneous
transactions between its suppliers and consumers. Since American Express ought to be limited to
transaction platforms, this is a stronger reason to hold that the case does not apply to Safeway.
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If a case does involve a transaction platform, the court must follow
American Express, but it can refer to the principles set forth above and
suggest that they provide an alternative and more accurate perspective on
the antitrust issues. Such comments would lay the groundwork for the
eventual abandonment of American Express.
Part I begins with the Court's most fundamental error: its
misconception of the proper analytical framework for a two-sided
platform case. Part II addresses market power, pointing out that the
easiest way to demonstrate Amex's market power is to infer it from the
likely anticompetitive effects of Amex's conduct. Part II also examines the
Court's unwarranted refusal to find market power from two traditional
sources of evidence: actual anticompetitive effects and market definition.
Part III analyzes the Court's mistaken claim that Amex's conduct was
justified. Part IV sets forth the principles that should inform future twosided platform cases.
I.

PROPER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

According to the Court, the plaintiffs did not carry their burden
because they did not include both sides of Amex's platform in their prima
facie case. The Court stated that "competition cannot be accurately
assessed by looking at only one side of the platform in isolation."46 As a
result, plaintiffs' proof of market power and their proof of
anticompetitive effects were rejected. The relevant market should have
included services to cardholders as well as services to merchants.47
Similarly, Amex's fee increases did not establish market power or
anticompetitive effects because "Amex uses its higher merchant fees to
offer its cardholders a more robust rewards program."48 The higher fees
may have reflected the costs of its rewards program and the rewards may
have increased sales. In short, plaintiffs had not proved that Amex's
higher fees exceeded the competitive level or that Amex had restricted
output. 49

46

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287.

47

Id. at 2286.

48

Id. at 2288.

Id. ("This Court will 'not infer competitive injury from price ... data absent some evidence
that tends to prove that output was restricted or prices were above a competitive level."' (quoting
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,237 (1993)).
49
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The Court's emphasis on two-sided analysis is often appropriate. As
Section L.A explains, a price increase on one side of a platform may fund
greater benefits on the other side, and the net effect on competition may
be positive. But Amex did not simply raise prices on one side of its
platform; it used exclusionary conduct to keep rivals from undercutting
its higher prices. As Section I.B shows, a one-sided analysis may be
entirely adequate to condemn such conduct.
A.

Price Changes on One Side of a Platform

If there is one salient message of the new literature, it is this: A
platform may change price on one side in order to adjust price or benefits
on the other side, and the effect on competition and customer welfare
cannot be determined without examining both sides of the platform.50
For example, a platform may raise the price it charges to customers on
one side in order to increase the benefits it offers to customers on the
other side. The higher price may substantially exceed the marginal cost of
serving the customers who pay that price, but this does not show that the
platform is exercising market power or exploiting those customers. The
additional benefits furnished to customers on the other side would bring
more customers to that side and cause many of them to spend more,
creating additional value to customers on the first side that may be more
than sufficient to compensate them for the higher price. The cost of the
additional benefits, moreover, may largely offset the extra revenues from
the higher price. As a result, the platform may earn no more than a
competitive rate of return from its new strategy. 51 Only if the strategy
results in a supracompetitive return-total revenues that exceed total
costs (including the cost of capital)-would it be appropriate to conclude
that the strategy created market power.5 2 And even then, it may raise
overall consumer welfare. Like any desirable innovation, it may create

5u See, e.g., Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 5, at 438 ("In evaluating such changes, there is no
economic reason why one would focus on losses to one group of consumers and ignore gains by
another group.... [C]orrect analysis of multisided platforms always considers all groups served by
the platform."); id. at 425 ("[T]he analysis needs [to] consider the welfare of all customer groups.").

51 See id. at 423 ("A platform [may earn only] a competitive rate of return yet price significantly
above marginal cost on one side.").
52 See Klein et al., supra note 6, at 575 (indicating that a payment system has market power
when it can "charge a total price above costs").
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market power, but the additional value to consumers may be worth the
higher price.
In short, one cannot conclude that a price increase on one side of a
two-sided platform creates market power, reduces competition, or hurts
customers as a whole without looking at the effects on both sides of the
platform. In fact, one cannot even conclude that the price increase hurts
the customers who have to pay it without addressing the value created for
those customers by the additional patronage on the other side. In this
setting-a simple price increase unaccompanied by any restriction on
rivalry-a two-sided analysis is entirely appropriate.
That is equally true when a platform reduces prices on one side, even
if the lower price is below the marginal cost of serving customers on that
side. While the lower price could be predatory, it is not predatory merely
because it is below marginal cost.53 The lower price is likely to stimulate
demand on that side of the platform, which will benefit customers on the
other side and enable the platform to raise prices to them, allowing it to
recoup the costs of its strategy. As Rochet and Tirole observe: "[I] t is quite
common for a platform to charge [a] below-cost (perhaps zero) price[] to
one side and [a] high price to the other." For example, media platforms
usually give away newspapers or free TV programs not to prey on rival
platforms, but to be able to charge higher markups to advertisers.54
Moreover, as long as that strategy is profitable in the short term, rival
platforms can emulate it. As a result, it would not eliminate equally
efficient competitors and would not generate supracompetitive profits.
American Express, however, did not involve a simple price increase
unaccompanied by any restriction on rivalry. Amex did not merely raise
its merchant fees repeatedly in order to provide a more generous rewards

53 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 5, at 437 ("[T]he fact a multisided platform is providing
goods or services to one of the groups it serves at prices that do not recover costs provides no
meaningful evidence that the platform is engaging in predatory pricing.").

54 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 4, at 659. These two economists "showed that the optimal
prices-both from the standpoint of profit-maximization and social welfare maximization-could
entail pricing below the marginal cost of provision to one side and above the marginal cost of
provision to the other side." Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 5, at 405; see also Klein et al., supra
note 6, at 595 ("[B]alancing by a payment system in a highly competitive market may even lead to
a negative price on the cardholder side of the market and a price greater than total costs on the
merchant side," though competition would "constrain the system to collect a total price that equals
total costs").
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program to its cardholders. It imposed increasingly stringent antisteering provisions to block rival credit card networks from undercutting
those higher fees. This conduct restrained competition on its face. Antisteering provisions deprive a rival credit card network of the financial
incentive to reduce merchant fees, since they prevent merchants from
rewarding the network by steering additional business to it.55 In addition,
when a rival credit card already charges lower fees, as Visa and
MasterCard did for years, merchants cannot pass on those lower fees to
consumers. Amex's conduct, therefore, led to both higher merchant fees
and higher retail prices.56 Removing its anti-steering provisions would
enhance the competitive process. Credit card networks and merchants
could compete more freely with each other, and consumers would choose
Amex only if they valued its rewards more than the discounts merchants
offered for using a cheaper card.57
As the next Section explains, when a platform's behavior restricts
rivalry, the plaintiff should not have to prove, as part of its initial burden,
that such conduct cannot be justified.
B.

Conduct that Restrains Rivalry

When conduct dampens competition, it is likely to increase the
defendant's profit margin, the excess of its price over its marginal or
average variable cost. This higher margin would increase the defendant's
incentive to make additional sales, since each additional sale now brings
greater incremental profits. To make those sales, the defendant may
spend some of that higher margin on increased marketing or it may
enhance the benefits it provides customers who purchase its product. But
this spending does not justify the anticompetitive behavior. It is a
consequence of that behavior, not a reason to allow it.

55 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 583, 607 (2018) (noting that "customers received no incentive to switch to a less
costly card," and thus, a rival credit card had no incentive to lower its fees).
56 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that
"prohibitions on merchant steering [have] enabled American Express's competitors to charge
higher all-in fees"); id. (finding that the provisions have "resulted in increased prices for
consumers... not only those customers who use American Express cards, but also shoppers who
instead prefer to pay using a lower-rewards [credit] card, debit card, check, or cash").

57

See Hovenkamp, supra note 55, at 607.
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Horizontal price fixing illustrates the point. When firms engage in
naked collusion, they not only raise their prices, they also increase their
profit margins. That may well increase the amount they spend on nonprice competition. Each incremental sale is now worth more than before,
so each firm has a greater incentive to gain market share. Firms may
attempt to acquire that share by offering potential customers better
service, faster shipping, larger rewards, or other incentives to purchase
more. While these steps would benefit the customers who receive them,
they do not excuse the price fixing. The benefits occur only because prices
have been elevated to supracompetitive levels. Absent the restriction on
competition, consumers would receive lower prices with fewer non-price
benefits, and ordinarily, they would prefer that package. For if any firm
had thought, prior to the collusion, that consumers wanted a different
package-higher prices with greater non-price benefits-it was free to
offer it.58

Non-price competition among the colluders might dissipate all the
profits from collusion. But this possibility is neither likely nor a reason to
allow the collusion. It is unlikely because, as George Stigler pointed out
years ago, whenever non-price competition is subject to increasing
marginal costs or diminishing marginal returns, firms will halt it before
total profits are driven to zero. 59 Writing for the Federal Trade
Commission, Terry Calvani made this point in an especially colorful
way. 60 Further, complete profit dissipation would not justify the

58 See Hosp. Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 298, 507 (1985), affd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the hospitals' claim that collusion on price would be harmless because it would be offset
by greater non-price competition, stating: "Once hospitals have deviated through collusion from
the competitive actions they would pursue independently, even increased competition in other
areas would not provide a price-quality mix desired by patients, physicians and third-party
payors"); accord 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 273 n. 10 (3d ed. 2011) (citing Hospital
Corp. of America with approval).

59 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 25-26 (1968).
60

[P]rofits gained from colluding with respect to fewer than all the dimensions of hospital
competition will unlikely be eradicated even by continued competition in other
areas.... There are.., diminishing returns to investing monopoly rents in other areas.
For example, hospitals may fix a percentage price increase for services of their radiology
departments. They could try to attract patients by taking that money and improving
patient accommodations. But a patient needs only one television and one telephone, and
the value of potted plants in the window may diminish greatly as more are added. The
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collusion, since consumers would normally prefer the competitive
outcome, in which prices are lower and non-price competition is
limited.61

The same reasoning applies to platform markets. Here too, as some
scholars have noted, platforms may increase prices on one side and then
compete away the profits by increasing benefits on the other side.62 But
here too, such complete pass-through is unlikely.63 Michael Katz and
Jonathan Sallet state: "As a general matter, economic analysis provides no
basis for assuming that price increases on one side of a platform will
always fully pass through to the other side of the platform in the form of
lower prices or higher quality." 64 And even if complete pass-through did
occur, it would not justify a restriction on rivalry. Consumers would
ordinarily prefer to let competition determine what price and non-price
benefits a platform offers on each side.65
An exception may arise when market competition itself is flawed.
When the market fails, unrestricted rivalry cannot be counted on to
provide the optimal mix of price and non-price benefits, and a restraint
on competition adopted by a defendant may actually improve consumer
welfare. Free riding is the best-known example of a market failure in
antitrust. When Dealer A free rides on the promotional efforts of Dealer
B, it undercuts Dealer B's incentive to provide promotional services,
preventing the market from supplying the optimal mix of price and
promotional services.66 A manufacturer can correct this market failure by
imposing a restraint on rivalry between the two dealers, such as resale

point is that the value to hospitals of increased competition on dimensions other than
those anticompetitively altered will dissipate greatly before all or even many of the
monopoly profits garnered from collusion are used up.
Hosp. Corp. ofAm., 106 F.T.C. at 507-08.
61

See id. at 507.

62

See, e.g., David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, in 1

ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 687,688 (Wayne Dale Collins ed. 2008).
63

See Carlton & Winter, supra note 33, at 230 ("The Stigler principle applies not just to

collusion but to any mechanism that eliminates price competition ....

".

64

Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2174.

65

See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 562e (Supp. 2017)

(critiquing the Second Circuit decision on this ground).
66 See John B. Kirkwood, Rethinking Antitrust Policy Toward RPM, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 423,
443 (2010).
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price maintenance or exclusive territories. 67 And if the manufacturer
chooses the restraint that is the least restrictive necessary to correct the
market failure, the restraint may promote competition and benefit
consumers, even though retail prices rise.
The burden of establishing a market failure, however, should rest on
the defendant, not the plaintiff. The defendant knows why it imposed the
restraint. It also typically understands the business better than the
plaintiff and possesses more of the relevant information. It is in a better
position, therefore, to identify the most likely market failures and support
them.68 If the burden of disproving the existence of any market failures
rested on the plaintiff, it would have to raise and rebut every reasonable
possibility, which would be inefficient. The higher costs would discourage
antitrust enforcement. For these reasons, the defendants have the burden
69
of establishing a justification under the traditional rule of reason.
The Court's famous rejection of the claim that "anticompetitive
effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences
in another"70 accords with this analysis. It suggests that if the two sides of
a platform are separate antitrust markets, as they should normally be,71 a
platform cannot justify a restriction on one side by benefits it provides to
customers on the other. It cannot use anticompetitive conduct to extract
wealth from one customer group and then justify that conduct by
funneling the proceeds to another customer group. 72
67

See id. at 445-48 (discussing alternative ways of addressing free riding).

See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 57 ("Because the defendant is the creator of its restraint and
presumably knows what its motives were, it is in a far better position to provide proof of its rationale
and effects."); Carlton & Winter, supra note 33, at 239; Rise v. Sunrise Express Inc., 217 F.3d 492,
493 (7th Cir. 2000) ("When burdens of proof are allocated, it is normally most efficient to place the
burdens of production and persuasion on the party with the best access to relevant information.").
68

69 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (describing the "three-step,
burden-shifting framework" of the rule of reason; in the second step, "the burden shifts to the
defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint").

7U

United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963).

71

See infra Section 1I.C.

See Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2171 (stating that users on one side of a platform are entitled
to protection from anticompetitive harm "regardless of whether the platform shares with users on
some other side some of the fruits of the harm to competition"); Brief for John M. Connor et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454), 2017
WL 2889690 ("[T]he effects on cardholders should not be considered offsetting procompetitive
effects. Any such benefits to cardholders flow from the merchant restraints that support the
supracompetitive merchant fees."); see also C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm
72
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As noted, if the defendant shows that its restraint corrected a market
failure, the net benefits on both sides of its platform might justify the
restraint. But in American Express, the Court failed to identify a true
market failure. 73 Consequently, it was unnecessary to assess whether the
benefits Amex provided to its cardholders could justify its anti-steering
provisions.74
In sum, the Court's most fundamental error in American Express
was its ruling that in a two-sided platform case, the plaintiff must show,
in the first step of the rule of reason, that the defendant's conduct caused
net harm to customers on both sides of its platform combined. This
requirement, unprecedented in the Court's decisions, is not only
substantively wrong, it will force plaintiffs in two-sided platform cases to
address market power, anticompetitive effects, and justification all at
once, at the beginning of their cases. This is inefficient and will result in
more false negatives.75 To take advantage of this new framework,

Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078, 2107 (2018) ("Nor may a horizontal agreement be defended on the
ground that the resulting extra profit induces or is spent on increased innovation.").
73 See infra Part IV.
74 Comparing benefits on both sides of Amex's platform would have been difficult given the
differences in wealth on each side. See Harry First, American Express, the Rule of Reason, and the
Goals of Antitrust, 98 NEB. L. REV. 319, 340 (2019) (pointing out that "all consumers, even those
who pay with cash, are affected on the merchant side, at least to some extent, but only Amex
cardholders are benefited on the issuance side, certainly a group that is different, smaller, and likely
wealthier"). Some scholars oppose cross-market tradeoffs because they can be difficult to
implement and may undermine political support for the antitrust laws. See JONATHAN B. BAKER,
THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 192 (2019). It was unnecessary
to address the force of these objections in American Express because there was no reason to make a
cross-market tradeoff.
75 Some scholars agree with this ruling. See Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Burdens and
Balancing in Multisided Markets: The First PrinciplesApproach of Ohio v. American Express, 54
REV. INDUS. ORG. 717, 730 (2019) ("[W]ithin the three-step rule of reason analysis a plaintiff cannot
establish its prima facie burden of anticompetitive harm without an assessment of both sides.");
Brief for Professor David S. Evans & Prof. Richard Schmalensee as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 6, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454), 2018 WL 798389 ("There is
simply no way to know.., whether a practice is anticompetitive without at least considering both
types of customers.... That analysis must, therefore, happen at the first stage of the rule of reason
to assess whether the conduct is anticompetitive or not."). This view is plainly not correct when the
challenged conduct restricts rivalry on one side of the platform and the defendant cannot establish
a market failure that might justify the restraint. For example, if the four major credit card companies
conspire to fix their merchant fees, the plaintiff can establish that the collusion is anticompetitive
without addressing whether it resulted in an increase in cardholder rewards.
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moreover, numerous defendants are likely to claim that they operate twosided platforms, further inhibiting antitrust enforcement.76 The Court
overlooked all of these problems. 77
The Court's other significant mistakes also threaten to undermine
effective antitrust enforcement. Part II addresses market power and
anticompetitive effects. Part III discusses justifications.
II.

MARKET POWER AND ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS

The plaintiffs tried to establish Amex's market power through the
customary route first: they defined a relevant market and calculated
Amex's market share. They argued that the relevant market was credit
card services provided to merchants,78 and that Amex's share of this
market was 26.4%.79 Since that share is below the usual threshold for
market power, they contended that Amex nevertheless had power
because its brand was differentiated from other credit card brands due to
"cardholder insistence," the strong preference of many Amex cardholders
to use their Amex card rather than some other card.80 The plaintiffs also

76 See Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 48 ("[U]nder the AmEx standard, we can expect an
outpouring of defendants emphatically claiming to be two-sided .... ).
77 Perhaps the Court increased the plaintiffs burden of proof because it feared that otherwise
antitrust actions would chill procompetitive conduct. The Court expressed a similar concern when
it insisted on a two-sided market definition. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287 ("Any other
analysis would lead to 'mistaken inferences' of the kind that could 'chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect."' (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993)). But that would be puzzling. The Court has pointed out many times
that antitrust enforcement against vertical restraints threatens to chill procompetitive conduct. See
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 41-42 (1977). Yet the
Court has never required a plaintiff challenging a vertical restraint to refute potential justifications
as part of its initial burden.
78

See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 170-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

Id. at 188. In contrast, Amex maintained that the relevant market should be defined in terms
of transactions, not services. Since a credit card transaction always involves a merchant and a
cardholder, Amex's position would "collapse all services provided to merchants and
cardholders.., into a single antitrust market." Id. at 172. Amex's market definition, however,
would not change its market share. See infra Section II.C.2.
79

8o See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 191 ("Amex's market share alone likely would not
suffice to prove market power ... were it not for the amplifying effect of cardholder insistence.");
id. (describing cardholder insistence as the "segment of Amex's cardholder base who insist on
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rested heavily on Amex's repeated increases in its merchant fees during
the period 2005 to 2010. They asserted that these fee increases
demonstrated Amex's market power and showed that its anti-steering
provisions were anticompetitive.81
The Supreme Court refused to find market power or conclude that
the fee increases were anticompetitive. The following Sections explain
why these conclusions were incorrect. The first applies an approach to
market power that neither the Court nor the parties considered.
Recommended in a recent article,82 it asks whether the defendant's
conduct likely caused prices to rise above or remain above the
competitive level. The second Section addresses whether Amex's fee
increases showed market power. The third Section discusses market
definition.
A.

PricesAbove the But-For Level

In a recent article, I proposed that courts infer market power from
the likely effects of the defendant's conduct. Specifically, if the challenged
conduct is likely to raise prices significantly above the prevailing level or
maintain prices significantly above the but-for level, a court should find
market power.8 3 The prevailing level is the price level that existed prior to
the challenged conduct. The but-for level is the price level that would
have existed had the challenged conduct not occurred, the price level that
unfettered competition would have produced. Both measures of the
competitive level are theoretically appropriate, generally practical, and a
short step from existing precedent. It is well-established that courts may
infer market power from the actual anticompetitive effects of the
challenged conduct.84 This proposal would simply extend the inference
paying with their Amex cards and who would shop elsewhere or spend less if unable to use their
cards of choice").
81

See id. at 195-97, 215-17.

82

See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1172.

83Monopoly power should be found if the conduct would produce a substantial difference
between the current price and either measure of the competitive level. Id. at 1173.
84 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,465 (1992); FTC v. Ind.
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,237 (1899); Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp.
v. Barr Labs., Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101,

2020]

THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN EXPRESS

1827

to the likely anticompetitive effects of this conduct, a step many scholars
have endorsed.85 The approach would not only make market power
determination simpler, more direct, and more reliable, it would also
enhance antitrust enforcement. Courts could determine market power
and anticompetitive effects at the same time, while inferring the relevant
market from the result, increasing the efficiency of antitrust law.86
In American Express, this approach would have readily
demonstrated Amex's market power. As the Supreme Court recognized
and the district court found, Amex's anti-steering provisions enabled it
to preserve higher merchant fees-fees that exceeded the but-for level, the
level that would have prevailed had merchants been able to steer
customers to cheaper credit cards. The Supreme Court's review of Amex's
business strategy made clear that the goal of its steering ban was to
maintain higher fees. The Court noted that "[w] hile Visa and MasterCard
earn half of their revenue by collecting interest from their
cardholders.... Amex instead earns most of its revenue from merchant
fees."87 Amex's business model was "spend-centric," not "lend-centric."88
To encourage the necessary cardholder spending, "Amex provides better
rewards than other networks,"89 and to finance these rewards, "Amex
must charge merchants higher fees than its rivals." 90 Merchants, of
course, "would prefer not to pay the higher fees,"91 and to "try to avoid
them," they would like to steer their customers to credit cards with lower
merchant fees.92 Amex prevents this by prohibiting steering. 93 In short,

107 (2d Cir. 2002); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000); Re/Max Int'l, Inc.
v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1016-19 (6th Cir. 1999); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc.,
142 F.3d 90, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1998).
85See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1178 n.38, 1179 n.42.
86 When market power can be determined from the likely effects of the challenged conduct,
courts do not need to define a relevant market. But since precedent still requires market definition,
courts can save time-and increase the efficiency of antitrust litigation-by inferring the relevant
market from their conduct analysis. Id.

87

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2282 (2018).

88See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
89Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2282.
90

Id.

91

Id. at 2283.

92

Id.

93

Id.
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Amex's steering ban was intended to protect its higher merchant fees
from erosion.94
The district court was even clearer. It found-in findings not
disturbed on appeal-that Amex's anti-steering provisions caused
merchant fees to be "higher"95 and that, without these provisions, fees
would be "lower."96 The court noted that the provisions "reduce
American Express's incentive-as well as those of Visa, MasterCard, and
Discover-to offer merchants lower discount rates."97 The provisions
thus "vitiat[e] an important source of downward pressure on Defendants'
merchant pricing [and produce] higher profit-maximizing prices across
the network services market."98 Amex executives "testified that the
network would face increased pressure to reduce its rates if merchants
could shift share to a less expensive network."99 Discover's experience was
particularly notable. In the late 1990s it embarked on a "major
campaign" 100 to grow its market share by emphasizing to merchants that
it charged the lowest fees. But "due to the anti-steering rules maintained
at the time by Visa, MasterCard, and American Express,"101 merchants
could not shift business to Discover. As a result, it abandoned the
campaignlo2 and subsequently raised its merchant fees.103 Given this
evidence, the district court concluded that eliminating Amex's antisteering provisions would "foster greater interbrand competition among
the ... networks and restore downward pressure on their merchant
prices."104 That in turn would "result in lower swipe fees charged to
merchants by American Express and its competitors." 105

94 See Wu, supranote 44, at 121 (stating that Amex justified its ban "by arguing that its business
model depended on... higher merchant fees").

95See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
96

See id. at 219.

Id. at 207; accord Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 33 (stating that restraints on steering remove
the "strategic impetus for a price cut").
97

98

Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 209.

99

Id. at 220.

looId. at213.
lolId. at214.
N2

Id.

103

Id. at213-14.

104

Id. at218.

1o5 Id. at219.
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In sum, Amex's steering ban almost certainly resulted in merchant
fees above the but-for level. 106 The proposed approach is thus the simplest
and clearest way of demonstrating Amex's market power. 107 The next
most potent evidence is the fee increases that Amex imposed on
merchants during the mid-to-late 2000s. These price increases were
critical to the plaintiffs' attempt to show power and impact. Indeed, the
Supreme Court asserted that the "plaintiffs stake their entire case on
proving that Amex's agreements increase merchant fees."i10 While the
Court did not accept this evidence, it should have.
B.

Repeated Fee Increases

Starting in 2005 and continuing until 2010, Amex repeatedly
increased its merchant fees. 109 This initiative, which Amex called its Value
Recapture program, involved over twenty separate price hikes,110 and
Amex accomplished them without losing any of its large merchant
customers. 1 1 The plaintiffs argued that Amex's ability to increase
merchant fees with such impunity showed that it had market power. The

106 Before the Supreme Court, Amex claimed that "the record contradicts the premise that the
nondiscrimination provisions cause merchants to pay higher fees." Brief for Respondents Am.
Express Co. & Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., at 28, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct.
2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454). Amex did not, however, contest any of the district court's contrary
findings. Instead, Amex supported its assertion with a single industry fact: after Visa and
MasterCard abandoned their anti-steering provisions, fees did not fall at merchants that did not
accept Amex. Id. These merchants, who were no longer bound by any steering ban, could have
steered their customers to cards with lower fees. But as the district court pointed out, the vast
majority of these merchants are very small and may well have concluded that they would gain too
little to incur the costs of a steering campaign. See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 222-23.
l07 As noted, the district court found that Amex's conduct not only preserved its high merchant
fees but also kept retail prices higher at merchants that accepted its card. This, too, shows that Amex
had market power. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 50 ("That finding alone was sufficient to
establish the defendant's power, as well as anticompetitive effects."). The Supreme Court ignored
this finding, as it ignored many other findings below. See id. at 55-56, 89.

lu8 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287.
109

See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195.

"o

Id. at 196.

il Id. at 195 (stating that Amex implemented Value Recapture "without losing a single large
merchant and losing relatively few small merchants .... ).
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plaintiffs also claimed that the fee increases constituted actual
anticompetitive effects, which showed both power and impact.
The Supreme Court dismissed these arguments on multiple and
overlapping grounds. It concluded (1) that Amex's higher fees reflected
an increase in the value of its services;112 (2) that plaintiffs had not shown
that the higher fees exceeded the competitive level;113 (3) that plaintiffs
could not establish market power from actual anticompetitive effects
because this is a vertical case; 114 and (4) that industry output grew
dramatically, which is inconsistent with anticompetitive fee increases. 115
All of these rulings were incorrect.
1.

Increased Value

The Court's claim that Amex's fee increases reflected an increase in
the value of its services, not an exercise of market power, is inconsistent
with the timing and stated reason for the increases. Amex raised its fees
during the period 2005 to 2010.116 Why then? What explains this timing?
It was not because Amex had just expanded its rewards program. To the
contrary, the causation went in reverse: after Amex raised fees, it poured
some-but not all-of the additional revenue it made into higher
rewards.117 Likewise, it was not because Amex had just tightened its antisteering provisions. That had occurred more than a decade earlier.118 In
short, neither a simple procompetitive theory-Amex raised fees because
it had increased cardholder rewards and its cardholders were therefore
more valuable to merchants-or a simple anticompetitive theory-Amex
raised fees because it had strengthened its anti-steering provisionsapplied. Instead, Amex was reacting to the erosion of its historical price
premium. As the Court noted, Amex had historically charged the highest

112

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286-88; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text..

113

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286-88.

114

See id. at 2285 n.7.

15 See id. at 2288.
116

See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.

See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 196 (noting that the fee increases "were not paired with
offsetting adjustments on the cardholder side of the platform").
17

118 Amex's anti-steering provisions originated in the 1950s and were strengthened in the late
1980s and early 1990s, long before the fee increases in question. See id. at 161.
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merchant fees, a reflection of its relatively affluent and high-spending
cardholders.119 In the early 2000s, Visa and MasterCard increased their
merchant fees and Amex had not kept pace. 120 As a result, Amex had
unexploited pricing power: its cardholders were still more valuable as a
group than Visa's and MasterCard's but Amex was no longer charging
for this added value. It could therefore recapture this value without losing
significant numbers of merchants, just as the name of its program implied
("Value Recapture"). 121
By its very nature, then, Amex's initiative represented the exercise of
market power. It enabled Amex to exert pricing power it had temporarily
left dormant. It was reclaiming the pricing premium it had previously
commanded. The Court completely missed this; it thought that Amex's
serial fee increases were explained by the higher value Amex was
supplying merchants. But the timing and stated goal of Amex's strategy
made clear that Amex was not raising price because it had created new
value; it was recapturing existing value. 122
2.

Price Above the Competitive Level

The Court also objected to the plaintiffs' proof of market power
because the plaintiffs had supposedly not shown that Amex's price
exceeded the competitive level.123 The Court did not define the
competitive level but strongly suggested that it could be measured by
either value or cost: "Amex's increased merchant fees reflect increases in
the value of its services and the cost of its transactions, not an ability to
charge above a competitive price."124 The first part of this statement is
incorrect: value does not measure the competitive level. Whether a firm
is charging a monopoly price or the competitive price, the value of its
product must exceed that price or consumers would not buy it. In

119Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2282.
12U See Am.
12

Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195-96.
See id. at 195.

12 To some degree, Amex was creating new value. It used some of the additional revenue it
generated from the fee increase to fund even greater rewards. But this extra value was a partial and
secondary consequence of its primary goal-to re-establish its historical price premium.

123 Am.
124

Id.

Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288.
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contrast, cost is a valid measure of the competitive level. If a firm spends
two dollars on a product improvement and that improvement creates ten
dollars in value, the firm can exercise market power. It can charge ten
dollars for an improvement that cost just two dollars to make. The
improvement is of course not an antitrust violation; it is an innovation,
and innovations are virtually immune from antitrust liability. 125 But it
does create market power because it enables the firm to price above cost,
and cost is the most common measure of the competitive level. 126
More precisely, marginal cost and average total cost (including the
cost of capital) are the standard cost measures of the competitive level. 127
In American Express, the plaintiffs did not establish either figure; the
district court made no findings that identified Amex's marginal cost or
its full economic cost. 128 But the plaintiffs did prove two things that
helped show that Amex was pricing above cost. First, they showed, and
the district court found, that Amex devoted only part of its extra revenues
to cardholder rewards.129 This means that Amex's merchant fees
exceeded a significant component of its marginal cost-the marginal cost
it incurs when a cardholder uses her card and earns a reward. Second, the
plaintiffs proved, and the district court found, that the Value Recapture
program increased Amex's pre-tax net income by $1.3 billionl30 and was
profitable on a return-on-investment basis. 131 These findings
demonstrate that the program generated revenues that exceeded its full
accounting costs. While accounting costs are not identical to economic

125 See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free
Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 39 (2015) (asserting that bona fide innovation is "essentially immunized
regardless of its anticompetitive effect"); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (declaring that it is contrary to the "prime object" of the Sherman Act to
condemn a firm that gains monopoly "merely by virtue of... superior skill, foresight and
industry").

126

See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1174-75.

127 See id.
128 "Full economic cost" is a shorthand for average total cost (including the cost of capital) since
that benchmark is meant to represent economic average total cost. See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at
1188. When a firm prices above full economic costs, it earns economic profits. Id.
129 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also id. at
216 (noting that plaintiffs expert "concluded that American Express spends less than half of the
discount fees it collects from merchants on cardholder rewards").
130

Id. at 197.

131

Id.
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costs, they do include virtually all categories of economic cost. 132 So if
Amex's higher fees exceeded its full accounting costs, they may have
exceeded its full economic costs and generated supracompetitive profits.
Proof of these propositions should have shifted the burden to Amex.
Once the plaintiffs demonstrated that Amex's fee increases not only
exceeded a significant part of its marginal costs but more than covered its
full accounting costs, the courts should have shifted the burden to Amex
to show that it was not in fact pricing above marginal or full economic
cost. This shift makes sense since Amex has the relevant cost data and the
resources necessary to produce credible estimates. 133 Because Amex did
not rebut the plaintiffs evidence, the Court could have concluded that
Amex's fee increases resulted in a price above both cost benchmarks.134
3.

Actual Anticompetitive Effects

The plaintiffs also asserted that Amex's fee increases constituted
actual anticompetitive effects and thus established market power directly.
This implication had been well accepted. Numerous courts had ruled that
when a plaintiff shows that the challenged practice causes actual
anticompetitive effects, market power can be deduced from that fact. 135
In American Express, however, the Court held, for the first time, that this
inference does not apply to vertical cases. As a result, the plaintiffs could
not show market power without defining a relevant market. 136
This ruling was bizarre. If a plaintiff establishes that a vertical
restraint caused actual anticompetitive effects, it is unnecessary and
inefficient to require the plaintiff to show in addition that the defendant
had a substantial share of a relevant market. Why ignore direct proof of
market power and insist on indirect proof, when the indirect method-

132 The only economic cost that is not included in accounting costs is the competitive cost of
capital. See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1188.
133 See Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 363,
383-84 (1998) (recommending that the burden on profitability be placed on the defendant).
134 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (strongly suggesting
that Microsoft had been charging the long-term monopoly price-a price in excess of full economic
costs-because Microsoft had not contended otherwise).
135

See supra note 84.

136

See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018).
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the market definition/market share paradigm-is widely criticized as
frequently complex, time-consuming, and unreliable?137 Moreover,
actual anticompetitive effects cannot occur-in any type of case-without
market power. The Court did not address either point. Its only rationale
was that vertical restraints, unlike horizontal restraints, do not "involve
agreements between competitors not to compete in some way."138 While
that is, of course, true, it does not explain why proof of actual
anticompetitive effects does not imply market power in vertical cases. 139
Perhaps the Court thought that the risk of false positives was greater
in vertical cases. But if so, the Court should have articulated this
proposition and furnished evidence to support it. 140 Moreover, even if the
proposition were true, it does not follow that evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects should be discarded altogether. The Court could
have insisted that plaintiffs establish actual anticompetitive effects by
stronger evidence. Perhaps the Court was motivated by a different
concern. Perhaps it thought that market failures are more likely in vertical
cases, and when they occur, higher prices alone may not show actual
anticompetitive effects, since the defendant's conduct, by correcting the
market failure, may have produced both higher prices and greater
services. But if that was the concern, the Court could have made clear that
the plaintiffs obligation depends on the defendant's proof. If the
defendant establishes a market failure, then the plaintiff cannot show
actual anticompetitive effects unless it demonstrates both that the
defendant's conduct caused higher prices and that the resulting harm
exceeded the benefits of greater services. 141

137

See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1174, 1176-78.

138

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7.

The Court also stated that "[v]ertical restraints often pose no risk to competition unless the
entity imposing them has market power, which cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines
the relevant market." Id. This is also wrong. In the first place, market power can be evaluated
without market definition when the defendant's conduct has caused, or is likely to cause,
anticompetitive effects. See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1179-80. Further, if market definition is
always required to prove market power, then actual anticompetitive effects cannot be used to
establish power in a horizontal case. That would completely abolish the doctrine, further
undercutting antitrust enforcement.
139

140 See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 52 (finding it alarming that the Court cited no literature or
empirical evidence whatsoever in support of its view that market power cannot be inferred from
actual anticompetitive effects in a vertical case).
141

See infra Part III.
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In American Express, Amex did not establish a market failure.142 As
a result, the plaintiffs could show actual anticompetitive effects simply by
supplying substantial evidence that Amex's fee increases were not driven
by cost increases, a burden they carried. 143 Moreover, the plaintiffs also
established that Amex's anti-steering provisions facilitated those fee
increases. Without these provisions, the district court found, merchants
would have directed transactions to non-Amex networks, "moderat[ing]
its efforts to increase discount rates."144 Large merchants confirmed this
at trial, testifying that "were [they] able to do so, they would have
attempted to steer customers away from American Express to blunt the
effect of Amex's price hikes."145 Thus, the district court concluded: "In
preventing such mitigation, the NDPs were integral to American
Express's Value Recapture increases and thereby caused merchants to pay
higher prices." 146
4.

Output Expansion

The Court also refused to accept the fee increases as proof of market
power or anticompetitive effects because industry output "grew
dramatically from 2008 to 2013, increasing 30%." 147 The Court noted that
when "output is expanding at the same time prices are increasing, rising
prices are equally consistent with growing product demand."148 The
record makes clear, however, that growing product demand was not
responsible for the fee increases. As noted, Amex raised merchant fees to
recapture its historical price premium. 149 Later, output expanded across
the entire credit-card industry because all the credit card networks

143

See infra Part III.
See supra Sections IB, II.B.2

144

See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 215 (2015).

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018).

142

Id. at 2288-89 (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 237 (1993)).
148

149

See supra Section II.B.1.
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decided to invest more heavily in cardholder rewards.150 The fee increases
and the output expansion occurred at different times 151 and for different
reasons. Amex did not raise fees because the demand for its credit cards
had risen.
Likewise, the output expansion does not show that Amex's antisteering provisions were procompetitive. These provisions had existed
since the 1950s and Amex had last tightened them in the late 1980s and
early 1990S,152 more than fifteen years before the output expansion
began.153 Amex made no attempt to show that the output expansion was
linked to its steering restrictions, a disconnect that Justice Breyer
emphasized: "The fact that credit-card use in general has grown over the
last decade ...says nothing about whether such use would have grown
more or less without the nondiscrimination provisions."154
5.

Conclusion

Amex's repeated fee increases in 2005 to 2010 showed that it had
market power. Amex embarked on them not to cover cost increases but
to restore its historical price premium. At the end of its Value Recapture
Program, moreover, Amex's merchant fees likely exceeded its marginal
and full economic costs, the traditional benchmarks of competitive
pricing. While the plaintiffs did not establish either figure, they
introduced evidence that supported this conclusion, and Amex did not
rebut it. The Court claimed that the fee increases did not establish market
power because market power cannot be inferred from actual
anticompetitive effects in a vertical case. But that is nonsense. Actual
anticompetitive effects cannot occur without market power, whether the
15u See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 206 ("[C]redit-card networks are offering more and better
cardholder benefits than ever before, including enhanced fraud-protection services, airline miles,
and cash-back rewards. Increased investment in cardholder rewards has accompanied a dramatic
increase in transaction volume ....).
1s
Amex raised fees from 2005 to 2010. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. The output
expansion took place from 2008 to 2013. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288.
1s2

See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 161.

153

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288.

Id. at 2302 (Breyer, J., dissenting). At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts made the same
point, noting that an increase in transactions "has so many factors.., if the economy grows, then
the output of your product, credit card transactions, grows, right?" Transcript of Oral Argument at
41-42, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454).
154
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restraint is vertical or horizontal. The Court also asserted that Amex's fee
increases might simply have been a response to rising demand, yet Amex
had largely completed its fee increases prior to the rise in industry output.
These mistakes were compounded by the Court's insistence that in
a two-sided platform case, the relevant market must include both sides of
the platform.
C.

Market Definition

This Section summarizes the Court's ruling, points out that it had
no effect on Amex's market share, and shows that the Court's reasons for
requiring a two-sided market were inadequate. It also shows that a onesided market is likely to give a more accurate picture of the defendant's
market power and its scope is likely to be easier to determine. In short,
from every angle, the Court's insistence on a two-sided market was
unwarranted.
1.

Court's Ruling

The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' market definition and
held that a two-sided market was required, a market that combined
services to cardholders with services to merchants. The Court asserted
that such a broad relevant market was required for three reasons. First,
the competitive effects of a fee increase cannot be determined without
examining the cardholder side of the platform, since higher merchant fees
could lead to greater cardholder rewards, which would benefit
consumers.15 5 Likewise, the profitability of a fee increase entails a twosided assessment, because an increase in merchant fees could cause a
number of merchants to drop Amex, which could lead fewer consumers
to carry the card. 156 Finally, a credit card transaction cannot occur unless
both a cardholder and a merchant participate,157 which forces credit card
networks to compete for business on both sides of their platforms.158
None of these propositions, however, justifies a two-sided market.

155

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.

156

Id. at 2285.

157

Id. at 2286-87.

158

Id. at 2287.
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Amex's Market Share

The ordinary way that courts determine market power is by defining
a relevant market and calculating the defendant's market share. 159 The
goal of the exercise is to determine the defendant's market share since
market share is typically the principal gauge of a firm's market power. 160
In fact, whenever market power is an element of an antitrust offense,161
all court opinions, legal treatises, agency guidelines, and other authorities
state the minimum amount of market power required in terms of market
share. 162
In American Express, however, the Supreme Court did not calculate
Amex's market share. While it insisted on a two-sided market, it did not
identify Amex's share of that market. It did note that Amex's share of total
credit card transaction volume was 26.4%,163 and that the industry
measures market share by transaction volume. 164 But the Court's failure
to use this share (or any other share) in its antitrust analysis is puzzling.
Perhaps the Court was aware that the market share of a two-sided
transaction platform is the same whether the market consists of
transactions by one side or transactions by both sides combined. 165 This
means, though, that if the goal was to determine Amex's market share,
the debate over the definition of the relevant market was irrelevant.
3.

Reasons for a Two-Sided Market

The Court's first reason for requiring a two-sided market is that a
price increase on one side of a platform may lead to a benefit increase on
the other side. As a result, the full impact of the price increase on all of
Amex's customers cannot be determined without examining both sides

159

See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1206.

16U

See id.

161

See id. at 1173 (pointing out that market power is an element of most antitrust offenses).

162

Louis Kaplow, Market Definition, Market Power, 43 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 148, 153 (2015).

163

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2282.

164

See id. at 2286.

That is because a transaction always involves a customer on one side and a customer on the
other side.
165
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of the platform.166 While that proposition is correct, it misstates the
proper legal test. As shown above, the proper legal treatment of a practice
is not identical to a complete inventory of its effects. The correct approach
under the rule of reason, as the Court's own precedent made clear, is a
multi-step, burden shifting framework, in which the inquiry progresses
to the next step only if the party with the burden in the prior step carries
it.167

In the first step, the plaintiff must establish that the challenged
practice "has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers
in the relevant market."168 If the plaintiff makes that showing, the "burden
shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the
restraint."169 The defendant cannot establish a procompetitive rationale,
however, without demonstrating the existence of a market failure.170
Absent a market failure, the restraint would not be justified, and any
increase in benefits it produces on the other side of the platform (e.g., an
expansion in cardholder rewards) would not count in the rule of reason
balance. Those benefits would not offset the restraint's harms.171
In the first step of the rule of reason, therefore, a plaintiff need not
tote up all the effects of the defendant's conduct and show that harms on
one side of the platform outweigh benefits on the other side. This showing
is required only if (a) the defendant first demonstrates a market failure
and (b) the plaintiff fails to show in the third step that the market failure
could be corrected "through less anticompetitive means."172 Under the
well-established structure of the rule of reason, all the plaintiff needs to
prove in the first step is that the challenged practice is likely to cause a
substantial anticompetitive effect on one side of the platform.
The relevant market, then, should be limited to that side of the
platform. If the plaintiff establishes market power and anticompetitive
effects there, it will carry its initial burden. And if the defendant fails to
demonstrate a market failure, there is no reason to examine effects on the

166

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.

167

See id. at 2284.

168

Id.

169

Id.

17U See

infra Part III.

171 See

supra Section LB.

172 Am.

Express Co., 138 S.Ct. at 2284.
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other side of the platform. If the defendant proves a market failure, the
inquiry may need to include the other side of the platform. But the court
can examine effects on the other side without broadening the definition
of the relevant market. The district court did exactly that in American
Express. It limited the relevant market to the merchant side of Amex's
platform, but repeatedly addressed the impact of Amex's conduct on
cardholders. 173
The Court's second reason for insisting on a two-sided market was
that a price increase on one side of a platform is likely to reduce the
number of customers on that side, which is likely to diminish the number
of customers on the other side. As a result, the profitability of a price
increase on one side of a platform cannot be evaluated without
considering customer attrition on both sides. 174 While that is true, it does
not require a two-sided market. All that is needed is that the court take
into account indirect network effects in evaluating the profitability of a
price increase on one side of the platform. 175 The district court recognized
this:
[A] price increase imposed by a firm on only one set of
consumers in a two-sided platform may appear profitable when
one considers only the direct effect of that practice on demand
among the targeted consumers. Yet in reality, the suppression of
demand on one side of the market may, by virtue of indirect
network effects, trigger a response among consumers on the
other side of the platform that, on the whole, renders the
practice unprofitable. 176
After considering these indirect network effects, the Court found
that a significant merchant fee increase would not be unprofitable. The
relevant market, therefore, was the provision of network service to

173 See, e.g., supra note 129 and accompanying text (addressing how much of the extra revenue
Amex made from higher merchant fees was passed on to cardholders in the form of greater
rewards); see also infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text (asking whether a merchant fee
increase would be rendered unprofitable because of cardholder reactions).
174

See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285-86.

See Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2159-60 (noting that a court must "consider cross-platform
network effects when applying [the] Hypothetical Monopolist Test to a multisided platform" but
"there is nothing" in single-sided market definition that prevents this).
175

176

United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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merchants, not the provision of credit card transactions to both
merchants and cardholders.177 In short, a court can "account for the twosided features of the credit card industry"178 without defining a two-sided
market.
The Court's final argument was that a credit card transaction
requires the participation of both a cardholder and a merchant, and, as a
result, credit card networks compete for both sets of customers. Although
that is correct, competition for cardholders would not normally
invalidate a merchant-side market. Competition for cardholders would
cause a fee increase on the merchant side to be unprofitable only if it
would quickly and completely dissipate the profits from the fee increase.
But that is highly unlikely. If Amex raised its merchant fees, other credit
card companies may raise theirs too, and the higher margins they all
realize may prompt them to expand their cardholder rewards. Yet even if
this eventually consumes all the higher profits they made, that would take
time to occur, and the fee increases would be profitable in the interim.
Moreover, as shown above, non-price competition is unlikely to eat up all
the profits from supracompetitive pricing.179 When Amex raised its
merchant fees repeatedly, it did not devote all the extra margin to greater
rewards. It channeled a significant portion to its bottom line. 180
In sum, the Court's reasons for requiring a two-sided market were
insufficient. The proper course is to limit the relevant market to the side
of the platform on which the anticompetitive effects are alleged to occur.
As the next Section demonstrates, that is also the most accurate and
practical way of using market definition to measure the defendant's
power.
4.

Superiority of a One-Sided Market

As noted, the primary point of market definition is to calculate the
defendant's market share. A larger share suggests greater market power,
and courts always specify the minimum amount of market power
177 See id. ("Notwithstanding the two-sidedness of the credit card industry... the court finds
inadequate cause to depart from" a market limited to merchant services).
178

Id. at 174-75.

179

See supra notes 60-64, 129 and accompanying text.

180 See Am.

Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 215-16.

1842

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1805

required in terms of market share. 181 The critical issue, then, is whether a
one-sided market or a two-sided market is likely to produce a market
share that more accurately depicts the defendant's market power.
In some cases, it does not matter. If the platform is a transaction
platform, the defendant's market share will be the same whether the
relevant market is one-sided or two-sided. 182 That means that a court can
define a one-sided market without fear that a two-sided market would
give a more accurate picture of the defendant's market power. In a
transaction platform industry, a one-sided market share is every bit as
accurate as a two-sided market share.
Where the platforms are not transaction platforms, the market
definition will matter since the defendant's market share would rarely be
the same on both sides of the platform. Consider Windows, which is a
two-sided platform since it serves computer manufacturers on one side
and app developers on the other side. It is not a transaction platform,
however, because Microsoft can license Windows to a particular
hardware manufacturer without simultaneously connecting that
manufacturer to a specific app. Consequently, Microsoft's market share
is unlikely to be the same on both sides of the platform. On the hardware
side, the D.C. Circuit famously concluded that the relevant market was
Intel-compatible PC operating systems and Microsoft's share exceeded
ninety-five percent.18 3 On the application side, Microsoft's share was
likely smaller since app developers could write applications for other
operating systems, such as Apple's Mac OS and IBM's OS/2, as well as for
Windows. 184 Let us assume that Microsoft's share on the app side was fifty
percent. 185 Calculating a two-sided market share would require knowing
the sales volumes on each side. If we assume they are equal, 186 Microsoft's
share of the two-sided market is just over seventy percent. This two-sided

181 See
182

supra note 162 and accompanying text.

See supra Section II.C.2.

183 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding district
court findings).
184

See id. at 52-55 (discussing Mac OS and IBM's OS/2 and applications written for them).

In other words, assume that app developers in the aggregate earn half of their revenues by
selling or licensing apps for Windows.
185

186 That is, the total sales revenues earned from selling or licensing Intel-compatible PC
operating systems is equal to the total sales revenues earned from selling or licensing apps for any
operating system.
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market share is misleading: it overstates the amount of competition
Microsoft faces on the hardware side and understates the amount of
competition it faces on the app side. As a result, insisting on a two-sided
market, as the Supreme Court did in American Express, would obscure
reality. It would produce a market share that would not accurately depict
market power on either side of the platform.187 The market share of
interest is the market share on the side of the platform where competition
is allegedly restricted. Since Microsoft was accused of excluding
middleware in order to protect its operating system monopoly, the
market share that matters is its market share on the hardware side
(ninety-five percent). Neither its market share on the app side nor its twosided market share would indicate so clearly its ability to demand a
supracompetitive price from PC manufacturers.188
A defendant might claim that it would never raise price on one side
of its platform because, if it did so, it would immediately and completely
dissipate the resulting profits competing for customers on the other side.
But evaluating that claim would not require a two-sided market. To the
contrary, when the court assesses competition on the other side of the
platform, it would look at the defendant's market share on that side, not
its share in a two-sided market. Moreover, as shown earlier, the claim
itself is highly implausible.189 Microsoft never advanced such an
argument.
In short, a two-sided market definition is generally undesirable. It is
likely to produce a market share that understates the defendant's market
power on one side of the platform and overstates its market power on the
other side. A two-sided market is also likely to be more difficult to define
than a one-sided market. The normal way to determine the breadth of a
relevant market-and thus the size of the defendant's market share-is to
apply the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, which asks whether a putative
sole seller of the candidate product would find it profitable to impose a

187 See Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2155 (stating that where "competitive conditions... differ
on the two sides of a platform," combining the two sides into a single market may "lead to a
confusing or incomplete picture of competition").

188See infra note 191 (providing another example of an industry in which a platform's market
share on one side differs from its market share on the other side).
189See supra notes 59-60, 64 and accompanying text.
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significant price increase. 190 To apply this test, a court needs to pick a
candidate product, identify its current price, and ask whether that price
could be profitably increased. A two-sided platform, however, does not
usually offer a single product and charge a single price for it. Instead, the
platform offers a set of products and services to customers on one side of
the platform and another set of products and services to customers on the
other side.191 Likewise, the platform charges an array of prices to
customers on one side and a different array to customers on the other
side. In the face of this variety, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test is likely
to be impossible to apply.
If the defendant operates a transaction platform, a candidate
product could be identified. As the Court noted, a transaction platform
can be viewed as selling a single product-transactions. 192 Yet this would
only solve part of the problem: it would select a candidate product, but it
would not determine the product's price. The price of a transaction can
be determined only if the platform's charges are assessed on a pertransaction basis. If significant charges are assessed on some other basis
(e.g., annually or when joining the platform), the price of a transaction
cannot be identified. In Amex's case, the district court found that Amex's
merchant fees were entirely imposed on a per-transaction basis.193 As a
result, the court could calculate the price that Amex charged merchants

190

See U.S.

DEP'T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §

4.1.1

(2010).
191

See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST: THEORY

AND CASE STUDIES 448 (2012) ("[S]oftware platforms, such as Sony PlayStation, provide game
developers with software code to help them write games and supply users with game consoles and
software enabling them to play games. Although games users and game developers rely on the same
code and hardware, they pay different prices and are receiving different services. No single market
share metric accurately summarizes the position of Sony or of competing video console makers. To
understand market dynamics, one must consider both the competitors' shares of video console sales
and their shares of game sales.").
192 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018) (noting that the essential service a
credit card platform provides to a merchant and a cardholder is the opportunity to engage in a
transaction with each other).
193 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that
Amex charges merchants a "single discount rate" on each transaction and "certain flat fees charged
on a per transaction basis").
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for a transaction. 194 In contrast, Amex's cardholder benefits (the negative
price Amex charges cardholders) were assessed partly on a pertransaction basis and partly not. 195 In consequence, the court could not
determine Amex's price to cardholders, and thus could not determine its
two-sided price-the combined price that merchants and cardholders
pay for a transaction.196 In short, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test could
not have been used to define the scope of a two-sided market, even
though Amex operates a transaction platform.
It is even more difficult to apply the Hypothetical Monopolist Test
when two-sided platforms are not transaction platforms. In such cases, it
is normally not possible to identify either a candidate product or its price.
By definition, these platforms do not sell transactions; they offer distinct
products and services on each side of the platform. Moreover, they sell
them in units of volume that are generally not comparable. A newspaper,
for example, offers subscriptions to readers and individual ads to
advertisers. Microsoft licenses copies of Windows to PC manufacturers
and provides a package of services to app developers. Neither offers a
single product or service, and neither offers all their products and services
in a standard unit of volume that could serve as a basis for calculating a
net price across the platform. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the
Hypothetical Monopolist Test could be used to define the scope of a twosided market where the defendant operates a non-transaction platform. 197
194 See, e.g., id. at 197 (calculating the impact of Amex's fee increases on its "weighted average
discount rate .... ); id. at 200 (calculating Amex's pricing premium over other credit card networks,
currently and historically).

195See id. at 160 (stating that Amex's rewards programs consist of a "combination of per
transaction benefits," such as cash back and frequent flyer miles, "as well as other membership
benefits," such as purchase protection and rental car insurance, which are not awarded on a per
transaction basis). If Amex charged some cardholders an annual fee, the indeterminacy would be
even greater.
196 See id. at 204 (rejecting Amex's expert's "two-sided price" calculations, in part because of the
"sharp disagreement" between the parties' experts on "the proper measure of payments made to
cardholders"); id. at 215 (stating that "neither party has presented a reliable measure of American
Express's two-sided price that appropriately accounts for the value or cost of the rewards paid to
cardholders"); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 741 ("[T]here simply is no concrete, objective
two-sided price.").
197 As Michael Katz & Johnathan Sallet point out, moreover, neither merchants nor cardholders
care about the two-sided price. See Katz & Sallet, supra note 9, at 2158 ("[F]or any given credit card
transaction, the merchant would rather pay a lower fee to the network, while the consumer would
rather receive a higher reward; neither party is interested in the net, two-sided price.").
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These practical problems constitute another reason to restrict the
relevant market to one side of the defendant's platform. In contrast, the
district court had no difficulty using the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to
delineate the scope of a one-sided market. 198
Finally, a two-sided market is likely to be flawed because it will
typically include products that are not substitutes for each other, like
merchant services and cardholder rewards. This would be a fundamental
error. The purpose of market definition is to separate the products that
constrain the defendant's prices from those that do not, and products that
are not substitutes for the defendant's products do not constrain its
prices. A merchant could not persuade Amex to lower its merchant fees
by threatening to take out an Amex card and use it to get cardholder
rewards. Cardholder rewards are not substitutes for merchant services.
Including these two services in the same relevant market was a basic
mistake. 199

III.

JUSTIFICATIONS

The issues that dominated the Court's discussion were market
definition, market power, and anticompetitive effects. In this case,
though, the ultimate issue was justification. Even if Amex had market
power, and even if its conduct raised merchant fees, this behavior might

198See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 176-79.
199See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2295-96 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Hovenkamp, supra note 55, at 607 ("Markets are always properly limited to reasonably close
substitutes and there is no reason to deviate from that principle in this case."); Hovenkamp, supra
note 1, at 57 (describing the Court's market definition as "economic nonsense .... ). Courts can
include products that are not substitutes when they define a cluster market. For example, the
relevant market for analyzing a hospital merger may be the cluster of acute care services provided
by hospitals in the area, even though many of these services (e.g., kidney dialysis and hip
replacements) are not substitutes. Such a market does not violate the principles of market definition
when (1) customers want to contract for a cluster of services and (2) the services are substitutes in
production. A hospital cluster market would meet both conditions. Insurance companies and
employers want to contract with hospitals that provide multiple services and, as a result, hospitals
compete to furnish an attractive and reasonably priced array. In addition, many of these services
are substitutes in production. A hospital can reduce the size of its dialysis center and use the space
for more hip surgeries if a rival hospital has increased its price for hip surgeries. See generallyABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 595-99 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing
cluster markets).
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have been justified if it had led to such large benefits for cardholders that
customers on both sides of the platform were, in the aggregate, better off.
As emphasized above, however, Amex could not, legally or economically,
lay the groundwork for such a justification merely by showing that its
anti-steering provisions increased cardholder rewards. Amex also needed
to establish a market failure. Section III.A explains why this is a
fundamental requirement of a procompetitive justification. Section JJJ.B
addresses the Court's claim that Amex's conduct did correct a market
failure and shows that the Court did not understand the issue.
A.

The Market FailureRequirement

A procompetitive justification cannot exist without a market failure.
While this requirement is not yet explicit in the case law, many court
decisions are consistent with it. 200 More important, it is dictated by simple
logic. A market failure is a market characteristic that prevents the market
from maximizing consumer welfare.201 If the relevant market has no
market failure, then the market is, by definition, maximizing consumer
welfare and there is no antitrust justification for a restraint on
competition. Unfettered competition is already achieving antitrust's
ultimate objective.202 To justify a restraint, the defendant(s) must

2oo See Newman, supra note 25, at 517 ("Antitrust doctrine generally supports the view that a
restraint is procompetitive if-but only if-it alleviates a market failure."); see also id. at 518-26
(analyzing cases).
21 See id. at 509-11 (stating that a "market failure occurs when the relevant market produces
outcomes that are less efficient than they might be" and that "judicial references to 'efficiency' are
best understood vis-A-vis a market's impact.., on consumer welfare").
2U2 The basic objective of antitrust law is preserving competition. As the Supreme Court
famously stated, the antitrust laws are designed for "the protection of competition, not
competitors." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). Competition, however, is
not self-defining. Consider a merger that lowers the costs of the merging firms and drives out a
rival. Is the merger anticompetitive because it reduces the number of competitors or is it
procompetitive because it enhances the merged firm's ability to compete? That question cannot be
answered simply by saying that the purpose of antitrust law is to promote competition or the
competitive process. One must look at the effect of the merger.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that the effect that matters is the effect on
consumers. Conduct is not anticompetitive unless it both reduces rivalry among firms and harms
consumers. The ultimate objective of antitrust law, in other words, is consumer welfare. Many
scholars have adopted this understanding. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and
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establish a market imperfection-a reason why consumers would benefit
from the restraint.
Market failure is a well-known concept in economics. It means that
the market has not achieved an efficient outcome, usually because it
exhibits one or more features inconsistent with perfect competition.03
The classic sources of market failure are information asymmetries,
externalities, public goods, and monopoly.04 Where one of these market
imperfections is present, the market would not reach the efficient result
on its own and government intervention or private corrective action may
be warranted. But where there is no market failure, neither government
intervention nor private restraint would be justified. They would only
reduce economic efficiency. The antitrust concept of market failure is
analogous. The only difference is that the ultimate goal in antitrust is
consumer welfare, not economic efficiency.205
As noted, a market failure requirement makes sense as a matter of
elementary logic. If there is no market failure, how could a private
restraint improve consumer welfare? But there are other reasons as well.

the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 435 (2009) ("The Antitrust
Standard is Consumer Welfare, Not Total Welfare."); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real
and ProperAntitrust Welfare Standard?Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010); Robert H. Lande, A Traditionaland Textualist Analysis of the Goals
of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2349 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2471, 2477 (2013) ("In sum, antitrust policy in the United States follows a consumer welfare
approach in that it condemns restraints that actually result in monopoly output reductions, whether
or not there are offsetting efficiencies and regardless of their size."); John B. Kirkwood, The Essence
ofAntitrust: ProtectingConsumers andSmall Suppliersfrom Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2425 (2013). More important, the courts have adopted this objective too. While they
sometimes mention other goals, whenever they have to resolve a conflict between another goal (e.g.,
economic efficiency) and consumer welfare, they always choose consumer welfare. See
Hovenkamp, supra; John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
ProtectingConsumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 225 (2008). There is
but one exception. In a case challenging anticompetitive conduct by a buyer, the welfare that
matters is the welfare of the suppliers that may be harmed by the buyer's exercise of monopsony
power. See Kirkwood, supra, at 2429.
203See ROBERT COOTER &THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 38 (6th ed. 2012) (stating that a
market cannot achieve productive and allocative efficiency unless it is perfectly competitive and
this "essential condition" cannot be attained if the market exhibits market failures).
204 See id. at 38-42 (describing the principal market failures as monopoly and market power,
externalities, public goods, and severe informational problems).
205

See supra note 202.
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As John Newman shows, the leading decisions on justification are better
explained by a market failure test than any other requirement.206 He also
shows that this test is superior to any alternative at minimizing erroneous
results. Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin use the concept to explain
why professional self-regulation may be warranted. They point out that
"professionals have traditionally engaged in self-regulation designed to
correct the sort of market failures that government agencies normally
regulate in nonprofessional markets. 207 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc.,208 the Supreme Court relied on market failure to justify
non-price vertical restraints. It stated that vertical territorial restrictions
could mitigate "market imperfections such as the so-called 'free rider'
effect." 209 And in American Express, the Court asserted that Amex's antisteering provisions were procompetitive because they eliminated a
"negative externality,"210 a well-known market failure. While the Court's
analysis of this market failure was incorrect, American Express itself
stands as precedent for the requirement.
B.

The Asserted Negative Externality

Amex's conduct did not in fact eliminate a market failure. Steering
does create a negative externality, but not all externalities are market
failures. When Firm A takes business from Firm B, it imposes a negative
externality on Firm B, but that is not a market failure. It is competition.
Conduct that causes a negative externality is a market failure only when
it both imposes costs on another firm and reduces consumer welfare.
Steering does not meet the second test: it improves consumer welfare. It
makes the market work better. It increases price competition, benefits
consumers, and corrects two real market failures. It was Amex's ban on
steering that caused the market to fail.

206 See

Newman, supra note 25.

2., EINER ELHAUGE
208 Continental
209 Id. at
21

& DAMIEN

GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 63 (2007).

T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

55.

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2289 (2018).
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A negative externality occurs when a firm imposes a cost on others
but does compensate them for the damage.11 The classic example is a
polluting factory that does not compensate the surrounding community
for the costs of its pollution. This causes the market to fail because the
polluting firm is not forced to pay for the harms it imposes and, as a
result, its marginal costs do not reflect the full social costs of its
activities.212 Consequently, the firm produces too much pollution and the
market produces too little social welfare. In the antitrust context, where
the measure of welfare is consumer welfare, a market failure reduces
consumer welfare.
The negative externality in American Express does not pass this test.
The Court claimed that merchant steering creates a negative externality
because, by undermining the "welcome acceptance" of Amex cards, it is
likely to cause Amex cardholders to use their Amex cards less frequently
in the future. 213 This is a negative externality-an uncompensated adverse
effect on a third party. Amex, a third party, is hurt when merchants steer
consumers to other credit cards and consumers use their Amex cards less
frequently in the future. But this adverse effect results from behavior that
increases competition and benefits consumers. Competition is intensified
and consumers benefit when they receive a discount or other reward for
using a cheaper credit card. Consumers also benefit from their use of
cheaper credit cards because it allows merchants to reduce their retail
prices across the board, intensifying competition at the retail level.
In sum, steering does not cause a market failure. It enhances
competition. Steering enables credit card companies that want to lower
their merchant fees to gain business as a result, increasing their incentive
to compete. The five-justice majority seemed to think that whenever a
firm cuts price and takes customers from a rival, it imposes an

211

See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

737 (3d ed. 2000) (defining an "externality" as "the direct effect on the well-being of a consumer or
the production capability of a firm from the actions of other consumers or firms").
212 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 203, at 39 ("The reason the market fails in the presence of
external costs is that the generator of the externality does not have to pay for harming others.... ").
213 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289 ("When merchants steer cardholders away from Amex
at the point of sale, it undermines the cardholder's expectation of 'welcome acceptance'-the
promise of a frictionless transaction. A lack of welcome acceptance at one merchant makes a
cardholder less likely to use Amex at all other merchants.").
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objectionable externality on that rival. But that would make price
competition illegal.214
Steering also corrects two market failures. First, it provides
consumers with truthful information about the costs of rival credit cards,
reducing an information asymmetry. 215 Second, steering forces Amex to
internalize the costs of its higher merchant fees, removing a negative
externality that reduces consumer welfare. When anti-steering provisions
are in place, merchants have to pass on the costs of Amex's higher fees to
all their customers, not just customers who use Amex.216 This imposes a
negative externality on large numbers of consumers: they pay higher
retail prices but Amex does not compensate them for doing So. 217 Steering
allows merchants to eliminate this consumer harm; consumers would pay
higher prices only when they charge with an Amex card. While Amex is
likely to lose business as a result, that is a consequence of its pricing
strategy; it could solve the problem by lowering its fees.218
The Court also asserted that steering would harm consumers
because it would reduce Amex's profits and force it to curtail its
investment in cardholder rewards, which benefit consumers. 219 The
Court even asserted that steering "endangers the viability of the entire
Amex network."220 But Amex cannot justify its steering ban on the
ground that it allows Amex to make more money, which it uses to expand
its cardholder rewards. Absent a market failure, that asserted justification
is not cognizable.221 Put differently, Amex cannot protect its business
model, its investment in cardholder rewards, and the viability of its
network by preventing other firms from competing with it. 222 Amex can
214 Cf Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 67 (pointing out that any time a merchant tells a consumer
that Seller B is offering a better deal than Seller A, it reduces the "welcome acceptance" of Seller A's
product, but "competition of any sort does that").

See Newman, supra note 25, at 543.
Otherwise, the merchants would be discriminating against consumers who use Amex.
217 See Hovenkamp, supranote 1, at 68 (noting that Amex free rides on the subsidies merchants
provide to purchases with its cards).
28 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25
26

219

See id. at 2289 (majority opinion).

22U

Id.

221

See supra Section LB.

222 As

noted, antitrust law protects competition, not individual competitors. See, e.g., Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) ("The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to
protect businesses from the working of the market .... The law directs itself not against conduct
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restrict competition only if its restraint corrects a market failure, and the
negative externality the Court identified is not one. At trial, Amex
attempted to show a genuine market failure, but failed. 223
The bankruptcy of Amex's position at the Supreme Court is
illustrated by a simple example. Suppose that Colgate and Crest compete
in the sale of toothpaste and that Colgate charges a higher wholesale price
than Crest. If the shelf price of the two products were the same, a retailer
like Safeway would want to encourage consumers to purchase Crest
rather than Colgate. It could steer them in that direction by posting signs
declaring that "We Prefer Crest" or by giving a discount each time a
customer buys a tube of Crest.224 Under Amex's logic, however, Colgate
could prohibit the signs and the discounts because they undermine the
"welcome acceptance" of Colgate, subject it to a "negative externality,"
and threaten the viability of its business model. At bottom, of course,
what undermines consumers' positive view of Colgate is not Safeway's
behavior but Colgate's prices. Safeway merely told consumers about those
prices. Blocking this truthful information would impede the working of
the market, stifle price competition, and harm consumers.
In sum, the Supreme Court's analysis in American Express was a
failure. It failed to recognize Amex's market power, disregarded valid
evidence of anticompetitive effects, insisted on an overbroad market
definition, and accepted an invalid justification. To avoid these errors in
the future, courts should follow the principles set forth below. They can
do so when the case does not involve a transaction platform, since, as
noted, American Express involved a transaction platform and should be
limited to transaction platforms. When a case does involve a transaction
platform, lower courts must use the Court's approach, but they can

which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy
competition itself.").
223 Amex claimed that if steering were permitted, some of its merchant services and some of its
investments in product quality would be subject to free riding. The district court, however, rejected
all of Amex's free riding theories and Amex did not appeal. See United States v. Am. Express Co.,
88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 234-38 (E.D.N.Y.2015); see also Newman, supra note 25, at 543 ("[B]ecause
American Express could have-andsometimes did-charge merchants for these services, there was
no externality. Where the ride is not free, there is no free-rider market failure."). Amex did not
assert the "welcome acceptance" externality until it reached the Supreme Court.
224 In fact, Safeway would lower the shelf price of Crest, but a discount at the cash register
achieves the same price reduction and produces a closer analogy with Amex.
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identify the correct analysis, explain why it is better, and recommend that
it be adopted in the future.
IV.

THE PATH FORWARD

The first three principles address methods of proving market power.
The final two concern the validity of a justification. With few exceptions,
these principles should also be followed in cases that do not involve twosided platforms.
A.

Market Power

Market power can be established through (1) the likely
anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct, (2) the actual
anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct, or (3) the defendant's
market share in a relevant market. A plaintiff may demonstrate market
power in other ways, such as by showing that the defendant's price
exceeded marginal cost or that the elasticity of its demand was low, but
courts rarely rely on such direct economic evidence.225
1.

Likely Anticompetitive Effects

Whenever possible, market power should be inferred from the likely
anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct. If the plaintiff shows
that the challenged conduct is likely to increase price significantly above
the prevailing level, or maintain price significantly above the but-for level,
the plaintiff has established that the defendant possesses market power. 226

225

See Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78

ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 733 n.17 (2013) ("[T]he courts typically find insufficient any direct evidence

of market power."). Indeed, one court stated that even if there were direct economic evidence of
power, the plaintiff would still have to define a market, at least roughly. See Republic Tobacco Co.
v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 737 (7th Cir. 2004) (declaring that "rough contours of a
relevant market" must be identified, since "[e]conomic analysis is virtually meaningless if it is
entirely unmoored from at least a rough definition of a product and geographic market").
226 If the defendant's conduct would raise price substantially above the prevailing level or
maintain price substantially above the but-for level, the defendant possesses monopoly power. For
definitions of the "prevailing level" and the "but-for level," see supra Section 11.A.
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The relevant market can be defined based on the analysis. This approach,
proposed in a recent article,227 has considerable scholarly support. 228
Courts already use similar logic when the plaintiff shows that the
challenged conduct caused actual anticompetitive effects. If the
defendant's behavior actually raised prices or reduced output, it is
obvious that the defendant had the power to cause those effects. Many
courts, therefore, have been willing to infer market power from actual
anticompetitive effects.229 The new approach would simply extend this
logic to cases in which the challenged conduct is likely to elevate price
above the competitive level.
The Supreme Court used similar logic in a recent case. In FTC v.
Actavis, Inc.230 the Court observed that a firm without market power is
unlikely to pay a large sum to induce a competitor to stay out of the
market.31 Such a payment would only be profitable if it enabled the firm
to maintain a price above the competitive level.232 In other words, by
paying to prevent entry, the firm is paying to prevent price from falling
to the but-for level. Courts can infer market power from that conduct.
This approach would not only simplify the assessment of market
power, it would also strengthen antitrust enforcement. It would allow
courts to determine anticompetitive effects and market power at the same
time, while inferring the relevant market from their findings.33 As a
result, it would streamline antitrust litigation and enhance its deterrence
impact. The approach would also improve the accuracy of antitrust
enforcement by avoiding complex and confusing decisions about the
scope of the relevant market. It would prevent courts from committing
the Cellophane fallacy,234 and it would broaden the reach of antitrust law,

227

See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1178-79.

See id. at 1178 n.38, 1179 n.42 (citing works from economists Steven Salop, Dennis Carlton,
Lawrence White, Phillip Nelson, and Gregory Werden, and law professors Daniel Crane, Thomas
Krattenmaker, and Robert Lande).
228

229

See supra note 84 (citing nine decisions, including four Supreme Court opinions).

230 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
231

Id. at 157.

232

Id.

See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1198 (explaining how a court can use its conduct analysis to
define the relevant market).
233

234 See id. at 1198-99 (describing the Cellophane fallacy and how the new approach would
eliminate it).
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enabling plaintiffs to challenge parallel exclusionary conduct that would
otherwise be immune.35 For all these reasons, the approach would
contribute to more aggressive antitrust enforcement, a goal that many
have endorsed.36
The approach would be workable. Courts already have plenty of
experience determining whether a disputed practice would increase price
significantly above the prevailing level. That is the central issue in
virtually every horizontal merger case. 237 While determining the but-for
level may sometimes be more challenging, there are multiple sources of
relevant information: an entrant's prediction of its future market share,
an incumbent's assessment of the impact of entry, an entrant's
introductory prices, an incumbent's response to entry, and the
incumbent's behavior in a more competitive geographic market. These
sources, plus the evaluations of economic and industry experts, would
normally enable a judge or jury to generate a reasonable estimate.238
In short, the proposed approach would be a simple, practical, and
efficient way to evaluate market power in an antitrust case. Since it is not
yet the accepted approach, lower courts could not use it without also
defining a relevant market and calculating the defendant's market share.
But they could point out its advantages over the traditional approach and
build a case for its eventual acceptance.
In a two-sided platform case, a plaintiff can carry its initial burden
by showing likely anticompetitive effects-and thus market power-on
one side of the platform. The plaintiff need not attempt to determine
whether benefits furnished on the other side of the platform "offset" those
anticompetitive effects. As noted, a defendant may use supracompetitive
profits earned on one side of the platform to fund benefits on the other
side, yet those benefits do not constitute cognizable efficiencies unless the
defendant shows that its conduct corrected a market failure. Absent a

235 See id. at 1199 (showing that the market power required to condemn such conduct could not
be found in certain circumstances except through the new approach).
236 See id. at 1170-72 (noting that leading senators, progressive organizations, the democratic
party, and prominent scholars have called for more vigorous antitrust enforcement).
231 See U.S. DEP'T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 190, § 1 (stating that the purpose of
merger enforcement is to prevent mergers that would enhance market power, that greater market
power leads to higher prices or other types of consumer harm, and that the agencies generally
analyze mergers in terms of their "price effects").
238

See Kirkwood, supra note 34, at 1200-03.
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market failure, market power and anticompetitive effects on one side of
the platform are sufficient to trigger liability.
2.

Actual Anticompetitive Effects

If market power can be inferred from the likely anticompetitive
effects of challenged conduct, it makes even more sense to infer market
power from the conduct's actual anticompetitive effects. While American
Express rejected this inference in vertical cases, 239 that ruling was
incorrect. Actual anticompetitive effects establish market power whether
they are caused by a horizontal restraint or a vertical restraint. Those
effects could not occur unless the defendant had market power.
The only qualification is that a price increase on one side of a
platform may not constitute an actual anticompetitive effect if the
challenged conduct corrects a market failure and thereby produces
benefits on the other side of the platform. In that situation, the plaintiff
must show that the size of the price increase exceeded the cost of the
benefits, just as in a resale price maintenance case. 240
3.

Market Definition and Market Share

In a two-sided platform case, American Express preempted the result
of the normal market definition process. The Court held that the relevant
market must be two-sided, regardless of what the normal tools of market
definition would indicate.241 As discussed, this rigid approach is
mistaken. If the defendant has injured competition on one side of the
platform, the best measure of its market power is its market share on that

239

See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

A firm may employ resale price maintenance to correct a market failure and stimulate
additional point-of-sale services. Retail prices would then increase, but the increase would not
establish market power unless the magnitude of the increase exceeded the cost of the additional
services. Otherwise, the price increase would not be above the competitive level.
240

241 See supra Section I.C. The Court allowed for an exception where the defendant's behavior
on one side of its platform would have only minor effects on the other side. For example, the terms
a newspaper offers its advertisers are unlikely to have much effect on the willingness of consumers
to subscribe. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018). In such cases, the relevant
market may be limited to one side of the platform. But where indirect network effects are
significant, as they would normally be in a platform case, the relevant market must be two sided.
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side of the platform, not its market share on both sides combined. In
addition, the scope of a two-sided market is likely to be difficult to
determine, since the standard method, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test,
is likely to be impossible to use.
Given these problems, a court should not attempt to define a twosided market unless it is practical to do so. That by itself is likely to limit
American Express to transaction platforms. Moreover, even when it is
practical to define a two-sided market, courts should define a narrower
market as well-a market limited to the side of the platform where the
competitive injury allegedly occurred. Such a market would be more
accurate and easier to define, and as courts recognize these benefits, the
narrower market may eventually displace the two-sided market
altogether.
B.

Justifications

The most fundamental flaw in the Court's opinion was not its
misguided market definition, or its cursory disregard of Amex's fee
increases, but its assumption that benefits provided to cardholders must
always be counted in the rule of reason balance. That is incorrect. Once
cartel members raise their prices, they have an incentive to engage in
more non-price competition, but the resulting benefits do not excuse the
collusion. They are simply funded by it. Consumers would have preferred
lower prices. Likewise, if a platform engages in anticompetitive behavior
on one side of its platform, harming customers on that side and earning
supracompetitive profits as a result, the platform cannot justify this
restraint by increasing the benefits it provides to customers on the other
side. Competition between platforms should determine the mix of price
and non-price benefits that a platform offers.
To justify a departure from competition, a defendant must establish
a market failure, a reason why unrestrained competition would not
maximize consumer welfare. Even then, the plaintiff may undercut the
justification in two ways. It may show that there is a less restrictive
alternative or that the defendant's conduct reduced consumer welfare
overall. But the defendant cannot show any procompetitive rationale for
the restraint unless it demonstrates a market failure.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court misunderstood the economics of two-sided
platforms. The majority thought that because a platform may increase
prices to customers on one side in order to provide greater benefits to
customers on the other side, any price increase on one side can be
justified by benefits furnished on the other side. But that is mistaken. If
the platform can raise prices on one side only because it prevents its rivals
from undercutting those prices, the extra revenues it makes on that side
are supracompetitive profits, which cannot be justified by diverting some
or all of them to customers on the other side.
Likewise, the majority thought that the relevant market had to
encompass both sides of a platform since a platform's actions on one side
are likely to cause responses on the other side. But that, too, is incorrect.
If the platform allegedly engages in anticompetitive behavior on one side,
its power to reduce competition is best depicted by its market share on
that side. While responses on the other side need to be considered in
defining such a market, they do not require a two-sided market.
The majority also overlooked more powerful evidence of market
power. It ignored evidence of actual anticompetitive effects because this
was a vertical case, not a horizontal case. But that is illogical: if a
platform's conduct caused actual anticompetitive effects, the platform
had to have the market power. Similarly, the Court overlooked the
significance of the restraint's likely anticompetitive effects. Extensive
testimony showed that Amex's steering ban almost certainly enabled it to
maintain its merchant fees above the but-for level, the level that
unrestricted competition would have produced. The gap between its
actual fees and its but-for fees demonstrated market power.
Two-sided platforms are increasingly important in today's high-tech
economy. But if antitrust law is to prevent them from suppressing
competition and harming consumers and workers, it has to apply the
correct analysis.

